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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-2854
___________
JENNY L. MERICHKO, 
                                         Appellant
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, 
Commissioner of Social Security
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-588)
District Judge:  Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 21, 2010
Before:  SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 2, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Jenny L. Merichko appeals from the order of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in
2favor of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) and denying Merichko’s
motion for summary judgment.  The District Court’s order effectively affirmed the
Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of Merichko’s application for Social Security
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).  The
District Court determined that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
decision.  We will affirm.
I.
Merichko was fifty-five years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision.  She is
a high school graduate, attended college for approximately one and one-half years, and
has work experience as a server.  She claimed that she became disabled in March 1996,
following an automobile accident in which she injured her neck and back.   In February
2005, she applied for DIB and SSI alleging disability due to fibromyalgia and cervical
and thoracic strains.  
After Merichko’s application was denied by the state agency, an ALJ held a
hearing on her claim in April 2007, during which Merichko and a vocational expert
testified regarding her condition.  In June 2007, the ALJ issued a decision finding that
Merichko was not disabled and that she could perform a range of medium work.   The
Appeals Council denied Merichiko’s request to review the ALJ’s decision, making that
decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
3In May 2008, Merichko filed an action in the District Court seeking review
of the Commissioner’s decision denying her claim for DIB and SSI.  As noted, the parties
filed cross motions for summary judgment, and, in April 2009 opinion, the District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner.  Merichko filed a timely
appeal. 
II.
 We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment.  McGreevy
v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment is appropriate when the
“pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  A court reviewing a summary
judgment motion must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.  Brewer v.
Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995).  However, a party opposing
summary judgment “must present more than just ‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations
or suspicions’ to show the existence of a genuine issue.”  Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005).
4III.
Upon review of the record, we find that the District Court properly granted
the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment.  Where a litigant challenges a ruling
of the ALJ denying a claim for DIB and SSI, judicial review is limited to determining
whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision.  42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Plummer v. Apfel, 186
F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)).  Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65 (1988).  If the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence, such findings are binding.  Knepp, 204 F.3d at 83.
Having reviewed the administrative record, we agree with the District
Court's conclusion that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.  We note
that Merichko did not identify to the District Court, nor to this Court, any specific errors
in the ruling.  Although Merichko was diagnosed with cervical and thoracic sprains as
well as fibromyalgia, she reported improvement in her pain with both physical therapy
and chiropractic treatment between 2001 and 2003.  By July 2000, Merichko’s primary
care physician noted that she had improved range of motion in her cervical spine,
shoulders, and hips, and much less pain in her trigger points.  By November 2002, her
fibromyalgia was stable and she reported that her cervical spasms were mild.  
In addition, a physician who examined Merichko in April 2005, at the
request of the state agency, found that her handgrip was optimal, her gait was normal, and
that she had a normal range of motion in her shoulders, elbows, wrists, and lumbar spine.  
At the administrative hearing, Merichko admitted that she took no
prescription or over-the-counter medications to treat her pain, and that she saw her
treating physician only once a year.  She further testified that she uses public
transportation regularly, does her own weekly grocery shopping and carries her own bags,
and walks frequently.  We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s ruling.
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
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